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WILL MEDICARE WITHER ON THE VINE?  HOW CONGRESS HAS 
ADVANTAGED MEDICARE ADVANTAGE—AND WHAT’S A LEVEL 
PLAYING FIELD ANYWAY? 
ROBERT A. BERENSON* AND MELISSA M. GOLDSTEIN** 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Congress is actively debating whether to reduce current overpayments to 
Medicare Advantage (MA) plans.1  In 2007, overpayments, i.e., the amount 
that MA plans receive in aggregate over what it would otherwise cost to 
cover the same beneficiaries under the traditional fee-for-service Medicare 
program,2 are estimated by government agencies to be 12%3 and by an 
independent researcher to be 13.3%.4  The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimates that reducing these overpayments to the level of local per 
capita spending in traditional Medicare would save $65 billion over the next 
five years and $160 billion over the next ten years.5 
 
* M.D.; Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute. 
** J.D.; Associate Research Professor, Department of Health Policy, School of Public Health 
and Health Services, Department of Health Sciences, School of Medicine and Health Sciences, 
The George Washington University Medical Center. 
 The authors would like to extend their sincere gratitude to Lara Cartwright-Smith, J.D., whose 
contributions to this article have been substantial and very much appreciated. 
 1. Robert Pear, Democrats Press House to Push to Expand Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2007, at A1. 
 2. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 243 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar07_Entire 
Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007] 
(discussing the concept of payment neutrality and that payments to MA programs are above 
FFS levels). 
 3. Id. at 243, 244 tbl.4.1; The Medicare Advantage Program, Trends and Options: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 
4 (2007) [hereinafter MA Hearing] (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional 
Budget Office), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/Testimony 
32107/OrszagTestimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 4. BRIAN BILES & EMILY ADRION, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: 
EXTRA PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, UPDATED TABLES FOR 2007, tbl.1, (May 2007), 
available at www.ocpp.org/2007/Commonwealth_Brian_Biles_2007_Updated_tables.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 5. MA Hearing, supra note 3, at 13. 
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Critics believe that these substantial overpayments to MA plans are 
unwarranted at a time of budget deficits and that this money can be used to 
fund other important programs, such as the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, and help forestall an anticipated 10% reduction in Medicare 
payments to physicians.6  Recent criticism states that systematic 
overpayments undermine and threaten the future of the traditional Medicare 
program by enticing beneficiaries to leave the traditional program and enter 
into an MA plan.7  Annually, MA plans receive approximately $1,000 per 
beneficiary in overpayments that they can use to offer extra benefits at no 
cost to beneficiaries.8  Medicare rules require plans to use the overpayments 
to buy-down beneficiary cost sharing, provide catastrophic coverage, and 
offer extra benefits, e.g., prevention services, eye glasses, hearing aids, and 
supplemental prescription drug benefits.9  Using part of the overpayments, 
MA plans provide more attractive prescription drug benefits than traditional 
Medicare, including substantially lower front-end premiums, some coverage 
in the infamous Part D “doughnut hole,” and somewhat more generous 
brand-name drug coverage.10 
 
 6. Pear, supra note 1.  See generally NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & 
MEDICARE, ATTACK ON MEDICARE: PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN SUBSIDIES WINDFALL FOR CORPORATE 
AMERICA (2007), at www.ncpssm.org/news/archive/vp_medicare_advantage/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2007) (discussing various perceived problems that result from plan overpayments, 
including the increase in Part B premiums for beneficiaries). 
 7. NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE, supra note 6. 
 8. See BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION: EXTRA 
PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS – UPDATED AND REVISED 2 (2006), available at 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Biles_costprivatizationextrapayMAplans_970_ib.pdf? 
section=4039 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (stating that the average 2005 overpayment per 
MA plan beneficiary was $992); BILES & ADRION, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that the average 
2007 overpayment per MA plan beneficiary was $1,008); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, at 11 (2007) available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/partnerships/downloads/MedicareAdvantage2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 
2007) [hereinafter CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007] (stating that in 2007, on average, 
MA beneficiaries will receive $86 worth of additional benefits per month). 
 9. CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8.  See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT 
ADVISORY COMM’N, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS (2004), 
available at www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Dec04_CostSharing.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT] 
(discussing the flexibility MA plans give managed care organizations in designing benefits 
packages). 
 10. MARSHA GOLD, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT: 
PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING FEATURES IN MEDICARE’S NEW PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM 5, 
11, 17 (2006), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7517.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2007); see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 253-59, 259 
tbl.4.10. 
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The extra benefits that MA plans provide entice both low-income 
beneficiaries without Medicaid or retiree supplemental insurance and those 
who can afford a supplemental Medigap plan to choose an MA plan and 
leave traditional Medicare.11  Indeed, of these beneficiaries who lack 
supplemental insurance (labeled active choosers), those with lower incomes 
and ethnic minorities are disproportionately likely to select MA plans, 
although the difference in enrollment compared with white and higher-
income beneficiaries is not great.12  MA plans are able to attract active 
choosers disproportionately because they can convert extra payments they 
receive into extra benefits, not because the plans are more efficient and 
thereby able to provide extra benefits.13  In the aftermath of the Medicare 
 
 11. See ADAM ATHERLY & KENNETH E. THORPE, BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, VALUE OF 
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE TO LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 6 (2005), 
available at www.bcbs.com/issues/medicaid/research/Value-of-Medicare-Advantage-to-Low-
Income-and-Minority-Medicare-Beneficiaries.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). 
 12. Id. at 3-4; see also CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8, at 9.  In 
criticizing these findings, others have analyzed the data without excluding beneficiaries on 
Medicaid and found that low-income and minority beneficiaries do not disproportionately 
enroll in Medicare plans.  See, e.g., EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES, LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY BENEFICIARIES DO NOT RELY DISPROPORTIONATELY 
ON MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS: INDUSTRY CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT BILLIONS IN OVERPAYMENTS 
RESTS ON DISTORTIONS 3-5 (2007), available at www.cbpp.org/4-3-07health.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2007). 
 13. There is confusion and disagreement over whether MA plans are more efficient than 
the traditional Medicare program.  Using 2004 data from adjusted community rate filings, 
CBO found that MA plans required 103% of traditional Medicare spending to provide the 
statutory Medicare Part A and Part B benefits.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DESIGNING A PREMIUM 
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 11 (2006), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7697/ 
12-08-Medicare.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM 
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE]. Using 2006 bids made by plans to provide Parts A and B 
benefits, MedPAC estimated that MA plans provide those benefits at 99% of Medicare’s costs 
and that health maintenance organizations (HMOs), the predominant MA plan, are able to do 
so at 97%.  MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: PROMOTING 
GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 63 tbl.3-1, 64 (2007), available at www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/Jun07_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, 
PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE].  As emphasized in the CBO’s report, these 
analyses are sensitive to differences in beneficiaries’ underlying health status. Therefore, the 
CBO tried to remove those differences by adjusting plan costs according to health risk. CBO, 
DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra. Another factor confounding the 
analysis of MA plan efficiency relative to traditional Medicare is that plans disproportionately 
serve counties where traditional Medicare spending is relatively high because payments to MA 
plans are based, at least to an extent, on traditional Medicare spending.  Id. at 12.  
Nevertheless, until adjustments are made for the geographic distribution of plans, MedPAC’s 
analysis will not be able to offer a conclusion about whether plans are actually more efficient 
at providing Parts A and B benefits than traditional Medicare. 
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Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA),14 
which substantially increased payments made to MA plans, “[t]he number of 
Medicare enrollees in private health plans increased from 5.3 million 
(across 285 contracts) in 2003 to 8.7 million (across 602 contracts) as of 
June 2007.”15  MA enrollment rose slightly in July to 8.8 million, bringing 
the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in private plans to exactly 
20%.16 
Observers have recently focused their criticisms on the possibility that the 
systematic overpayments and other advantages the MA plans enjoy, which 
this article discusses, will tilt the “playing field” in favor of private plans.17  
Their concern is that a long-term tilt could lead to the demise of the 
traditional Medicare program without Congress and the public ever 
debating the merits of this shift that would effectively privatize the program.18  
Giving beneficiaries the incentive to leave traditional Medicare for a private 
plan carries out former Speaker Gingrich’s pronounced strategy to have 
traditional Medicare “wither on the vine” through the voluntary decisions of 
Medicare beneficiaries.19  Ideological conservatives agree with liberal critics 
that the stakes involved in the political battle over Medicare Advantage are 
high.  In an opposite editorial titled How the GOP Won Health Care, 
Holman Jenkins, a member of the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board, 
 
 14. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). 
 15. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 1 (2007), 
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). 
 16. Stephanie Peterson & Marsha Gold, Tracking Medicare Health and Prescription Drug 
Plans: Monthly Report for July 2007, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Aug. 3, 2007, at 1, available at 
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/medicaretracking0707.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007). 
 17. See, e.g., Trudy Lieberman, The Medicare Privatization Scam, THE NATION, July 
16/23, 2007, at 14, 20 (contending that Congress is slowly draining Medicare to create a 
more privatized system and that, with some MA plans, seniors may pay more out of pocket 
than they would under traditional Medicare). 
 18. When the MMA was being debated, the issues that drew the most comments were 
those related to the structure and cost of the Part D drug benefit, including its “doughnut hole” 
in coverage, the “non-interference” clause precluding price negotiations between the 
government and the pharmaceutical companies, and its overall cost. See id. at 14; Paul 
Krugman, The Plot Against Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A23; Robert A. Berenson, 
Doctoring Healthcare II: Yo, Democrats! Medicare is Privatizing!, 18 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 
13 (Jan./Feb. 2007) (discussing concerns that the un-level playing field could effectively 
privatize Medicare without receiving public attention). 
 19. On October 24, 1995, Gingrich explained the Republican strategy regarding 
Medicare.  He said, “‘Now, we don’t get rid of it in round one because we don’t think that’s 
politically smart, and we don’t think that’s the right way to go through a transition. But we 
believe it’s going to wither on the vine.’” Adam Clymer, The Ad Campaign: Organized Labor 
Goes on the Offensive and the Republicans Cry Foul, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1996, at A8. 
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argued that Democrats correctly accused Republicans of privatizing 
Medicare by turning it into a voucher program.20 
The CBO’s most recent projection calls for MA enrollment to “grow at 
an annual average rate of about 7 percent over the next 10 years, 
compared with a growth rate of about 2.5 percent for Medicare overall—
reaching 21 percent of total enrollment in 2008 and 26 percent by 
2017.”21  However, these projections might well be conservative.  From July 
2006 to July 2007, enrollment in MA increased from 7.3 million to 8.8 
million, a growth of 20% in just one year.22  Additionally, after the MMA was 
enacted, the CBO initially projected virtually no increase in MA plan 
enrollment.23  Without changes in overpayments and the other advantages 
enjoyed by MA plans, MA enrollment growth might reach a “tipping point” 
where traditional Medicare will no longer be able to function in many areas.  
Critics predict that traditional Medicare’s risk pool will be compromised “as 
those with greater health care needs remain in the traditional program, 
paying . . . higher Part B premiums to subsidize overpayments to [MA] 
plans.”24  Critics are also concerned that substitution of an array of private 
plans25 will allow the program to alter its fundamental character from a 
social health insurance program providing a defined benefit to a voucher-
like program offering beneficiaries a defined contribution to use in selecting 
among only private insurance plans.26  A voucher-like program is a long-
standing goal of ideologically conservative Medicare reformers.27 
 
 20. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How the GOP Won Health Care, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2007, 
at A16 (arguing that, with the extra payments provided to MA plans and the new Medicare 
drug benefit, “Republicans have usurped Democrats’ role as Santa Claus to the middle 
class”). 
 21. J. TIMOTHY GRONNIGER & ROBERT A. SUNSHINE, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MEDICARE 
ADVANTAGE: PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS IN MEDICARE 3 (June 2007), available at www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/82xx/doc8268/06-28-Medicare_Advantage.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 22. Peterson & Gold, supra note 16. 
 23. Robert A. Berenson, Medicare Disadvantaged and the Search for the Elusive ‘Level 
Playing Field,’ 2004 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) w4-572, w4-576, available at http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.572v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (discussing how 
most estimates were inappropriately conservative because they missed the dramatic increase 
in the enrollment in private fee-for-service (PFFS) option, which is the fastest growing MA 
option). 
 24. NAT’L COMM. TO PRESERVE SOC. SECURITY & MEDICARE, supra note 6. 
 25. This includes the PFFS option, which is the fastest growing MA plan and attempts to 
mirror traditional Medicare’s open access to all providers. 
 26. See Stuart M. Butler & Robert E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare 
Program, 14 HEALTH AFF. 47, 51-52 (1995), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/14/4/47.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 27. See generally id. at 47-61.  A somewhat modified defined contribution approach, 
labeled “premium support,” has been proposed by many since it was initially suggested in an 
influential Health Affairs article. See Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The Medicare 
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Many healthcare system stakeholders have expressed increasing doubts 
about the ability of the market, generally, and private health plans, 
specifically, to address ongoing problems of escalating costs and mediocre 
quality and are looking for the government to serve a greater role as a 
steward of improving the system.28  In the MMA, Congress ignored these 
views and moved the other direction, threatening the very survival of the 
relatively successful traditional Medicare program.  This fundamental threat 
to the program comes as scholars increasingly are calling for expansion of 
traditional Medicare to serve either as a third-party administrator for self-
funded employers29 or as the basis for a national health system offering an 
array of private plans and a strong government-run program.30  However, 
an un-level playing field in Medicare would undermine these promising 
proposals. 
Whether within the context of the current Medicare program or in visions 
of a “Medicare for all” program, it is important to define what constitutes a 
level playing field.31  Even some of the current proposals for moving 
Medicare to a premium support model call for an explicit and important role 
for traditional Medicare.32  Although the current payment system for MA 
 
Reform Debate: What is the Next Step?, 14 HEALTH AFF. 8, 20-22 (1995), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/14/4/8.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).  For a 
detailed exploration of how premium support would work, see CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM 
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 3-6. 
 28. Len M. Nichols et al., Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health 
Care Systems? Confidence is Waning, 23 HEALTH AFF. 8, 11-15 (2004), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/23/2/8.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
Commenting on this paper, Alain Enthoven, one of the main architects of managed 
competition, lamented the failure of the market to address cost and quality concerns.  
Enthoven also stated that the country might have to move to “Medicare for all” by default. 
Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient Health Care Systems, 23 HEALTH AFF. 25, 25-
27 (2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/23/2/25 (last visited Sept. 
16, 2007). Ironically, program developments resulting from the un-level playing field suggest 
Medicare for none. 
 29. See Joseph White, Protecting Medicare: The Best Defense is a Good Offense, 32 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 221, 223-25 (2007), available at http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/ 
reprint/32/2/221 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 30. Mark Schlesinger & Jacob S. Hacker, Secret Weapon: The “New” Medicare as a 
Route to Health Security, 32 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 247, 271-84 (2007), available at 
http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/32/2/247 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 31. While some on the Right might prefer the elimination of a government-run program 
altogether, some on the Left seek a single-payor program that has no role for private health 
insurance, resembling the Canadian healthcare system. 
 32. Some advocates of major market-based reform in Medicare, based on premium 
support, have called for the traditional Medicare program to serve a major role as one of the 
competitors.  Before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Stuart M. Butler from the Heritage 
Foundation testified, 
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plans and a premium support system share some elements, they differ 
significantly in that the current system treats private plans differently from the 
traditional program.33  Under a premium support model, the traditional 
program’s and private plans’ payments would be established on the same 
basis.34  The government’s contribution would either be determined from the 
plans’ bids, with the “bid” of the traditional program treated like a private 
plan bid, or set at a predetermined level.35  Consequently, enrollees in 
traditional Medicare could be required to pay higher or lower premiums 
than they currently face, depending on the traditional program’s bid.36 
Whether the traditional program would be expected to be a passive 
payer, whose bid simply reflects its actual payments, or an active bidder, 
with an opportunity to use the bidding process to manage costs within 
 
  Because of the statutory basis of the fee-for-service benefits package and the 
many requirements Congress places on HCFA [CMS], it is currently very difficult for the 
agency to make improvements in the fee-for-service program so that it becomes more 
competitive and modern.  Thus, the fee for service [program] is inherently at a 
disadvantage when competing with the more flexible private plans now being made 
available to seniors. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Whenever a competitive market is introduced, the government-provided 
service must be given every opportunity to redesign itself to compete effectively. 
Restructuring Medicare for the Next Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (statement of Stuart M. Butler, Vice President for Domestic and Policy Studies, 
The Heritage Foundation), at www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/Test052799.cfm? 
renderforprint=1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).  The testimony did not address the issue of 
payment equity.  At the time, payments to private plans were slightly less than traditional 
Medicare payments before considering the impact of favorable risk selection that plans 
experience.  See Robert A. Berenson, Medicare+Choice: Doubling or Disappearing?, 2001 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W65, W76, W79, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/hlthaff.w1.65v1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (discussing the role of traditional 
Medicare in premium support proposals); see also Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, Structuring 
Choice Under Medicare, in MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
75-124 (Robert D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998).  Not all such proposals contemplate a role 
for traditional Medicare as a plan option.  See THOMAS RICE & KATHERINE A. DESMOND, THE 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., AN ANALYSIS OF REFORMING MEDICARE THROUGH A “PREMIUM 
SUPPORT” PROGRAM 8 (2002), available at www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/ 
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14147 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 33. Currently, beneficiaries who receive their care in the traditional program pay a 
monthly premium for that coverage equal to a percentage of national per capita Medicare 
spending. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r (2000). Beneficiaries who enroll in private plans receive a 
rebate or pay a surcharge, depending on whether their selected plan’s bid is below or above 
a benchmark that is constrained to be at least as high as local, county-level per capita 
traditional program spending. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-24 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 34. RICE & DESMOND, supra note 32. 
 35. Id.; CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 3. 
 36. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
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particular geographic areas, is unclear.  Although the issues in permitting 
traditional Medicare to become an active value-based purchaser are 
beyond the scope of this article, there have been attempts to identify 
purchasing opportunities for the traditional program.37 
This article attempts to analyze why the current playing field for 
competition between traditional Medicare and private health plans is 
severely tilted in favor of the plans.  Current public debate has focused 
mostly on overpayments.  This article begins with an exploration of how the 
payments can be modified to promote payment equity.  However, other 
important but less-discussed factors contribute to the un-level playing field.  
In turn, this article considers the following issues: benefits flexibility, 
including the concept of actuarial equivalence that plans take advantage of; 
the opportunity plans have to market their products and abuses in 
marketing; and the unique advantages enjoyed by private fee-for-service 
(PFFS) plans.  In each of these areas, this article offers suggestions for 
correcting the playing field imbalance.  The article concludes with a brief 
discussion of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
“boosterism” of private plans, demonstrating the need for even-handedness 
in the administration of Medicare. 
II.  FINANCIAL NEUTRALITY 
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which explicitly 
and consistently has supported the concept of a level playing field 
competition between the array of private plans and traditional Medicare, 
has defined financial neutrality as follows: “the Medicare program should 
pay the same amount, adjusting for the risk status of each beneficiary, 
regardless of which Medicare option a beneficiary chooses.”38  Recently, 
 
 37. There is growing literature on how the traditional Medicare program might be 
allowed to better manage costs and improve quality.  MedPAC has issued many reports 
presenting ideas for value purchasing.  For the author’s contributions on the topic, see Robert 
A. Berenson, Getting Serious About Excessive Medicare Spending: A Purchasing Model, 2003 
HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.), W3-586, W3-591 to W3-602 (2003), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.586v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); 
Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional Medicare- 
Should We? Could We?, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-54 (2002), at 
www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl65+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+139+(Autumn+2002) (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
 38. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2. The actual payments made 
to plans are based on plans’ bids against benchmark targets, a system that began in 2006.  
Id. at 243.  Plans that want to participate as MA plans must submit bids indicating the per 
capita payment for which they are willing to provide Medicare Part A and Part B services.  Id.  
Plans must also submit bids for the voluntary Part D prescription drug benefit and for 
premiums for any supplemental benefits they intend to offer.  Id. at 253.  Plans are paid their 
bids plus 75% of the amount by which the applicable benchmark exceeds their bid.  Id. at 
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MedPAC clarified that their position on financial neutrality could be 
accomplished by payment equivalence in the aggregate, with variations in 
local rates, or by payment equivalence at the local level, which MedPAC has 
long-preferred.39 
MedPAC initially adopted the payment neutrality provision in 2001 
using the following rationale: “Because health care is delivered in local 
markets, payment neutrality needs to be pursued at the local level.  Failure 
to make payments equal within a local market would give one sector—
either M+C [the Part C program before MA] or traditional FFS—an 
advantage over the other.”40  First, this definition, which ignores 
overspending in the traditional program and the actual costs of providing 
Parts A and B services through MA plans, seems to accept the systematic, 
geographically-based overspending in the program41 and essentially passes 
it through to the MA sector of Medicare; but, in so doing, the definition tries 
to maintain a level playing field.42  MedPAC’s preferred payment neutrality 
 
246.  Plans must return the 75% to beneficiaries as additional benefits or as a rebate on their 
Part B or Part D premiums.  Id.  Plans that bid above the benchmark are required to charge 
enrollees the full difference between the bid and benchmark as an additional premium. Id. at 
243, 247. The 25% government retention, which is effectively a tax on low bids, explains why 
MedPAC estimates that benchmarks in 2006 were set 116% above traditional program 
spending and actual payments at 112%.  Id. at 246-47.  Independently, the CBO similarly 
concluded that the benchmarks for 2007 were 117% and payments 112% of traditional 
Medicare.  MA Hearing, supra note 3. 
 39. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 252. Operationally, 
payment at the local level means at the county level because CMS collects well-defined, 
county-level, per-capita costs and can make other payment adjustments for beneficiary health 
status and for indirect medical education payments at the county level.  Id. at 243, 252. 
 40. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT 
POLICY 112-13 (2001), available at http://medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/ 
Mar01%20Ch7.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).  It is interesting to note that MEDPAC’s 
predecessor, the Physician Payment Review Committee (PPRC), took a different position on 
financial neutrality at the local level.  In its March 1997 Annual Report, PPRC stated, 
Many observers think current policies [financial neutrality at the country level] limit the 
growth of Medicare managed care by paying too little in some markets and promoting 
it in others by paying more than necessary to compensate plans fairly.  In any case, 
these policies hamper Medicare’s ability to benefit from the efficiencies of managed 
care.  Moreover, they do not encourage beneficiaries to make cost-conscious choices. 
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS xxi (1997). 
 41. See generally John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate Over Medicare 
Reform, 2002 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W96, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (showing that more than two-fold 
differences in spending does not produce important differences in quality of care). 
 42. An approach that would deviate from a level playing field would attempt to achieve 
savings from the potential efficiencies of private plans.  For example, the competitive pricing 
demonstration model that CMS attempted to implement featured competitive bidding by 
health plans in a local area against each other.  It did not refer to spending in the traditional 
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formulation would represent a substantial spending improvement over the 
current MMA payment formula, which pays MA plans 112% of traditional 
Medicare in aggregate and substantially more in some counties,43 and 
would generate substantial program savings.44 
Second, there is growing evidence that even traditional Medicare per 
capita spending, as calculated at the county level, provides payments that 
far exceed plan costs (including a reasonable profit), at least in those 
counties where plans are disproportionately represented (precisely because 
the payment levels have been so generous).45  For many years, policy 
analysts have thought that plan costs do not vary the same way that 
traditional Medicare spending varies.46  For example, over the many years 
when plans received formula-based payments, their benefits varied directly 
with their CMS payments, which were based on local traditional program 
expenditure levels.47  This fact indicates that private plan costs do not vary 
as much as the traditional program spending.48 
 
program, which might save substantially more as plans have an incentive to bid low to obtain 
business.  Before the Denver demonstration of competitive pricing was cancelled by court 
order, the available bids “were found to be 24 to 38 percent below the prevailing payment 
rate at the time (which was set at 95 percent of the cost of care in [traditional] Medicare, 
adjusted for beneficiary risk).”  Bryan E. Dowd et al., Fee-for-Service Medicare in a 
Competitive Market Environment, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 113, 117 (2005-2006).  
The health insurance industry argues, with some justification, that competitive bids from private 
plans without reference to traditional Medicare represents a tilted playing field, but, in this 
case, tilted to favor traditional Medicare, resulting in withdrawal of many plans from the 
program and an inability of plans to offer the additional benefits that many beneficiaries seek.  
Karen Ignagni, Putting Principles First: A Better Way to Carry Out a Demonstration, 19 HEALTH 
AFF. 44, 46 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/19/5/44.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 43. BILES ET AL., supra note 8, at 2; see also BILES & ADRION, supra note 4 (finding that, on 
average, MA plans were paid about 18% more than traditional programs costs in rural “floor” 
counties and 21% more in urban “floor” counties. Payments in some counties were 
substantially more than these averages). 
 44. MA Hearing, supra note 3, at 5.  MedPAC further suggests the amount of 
overpayments will actually increase in the near term because enrollment trends toward MA 
plans are disproportionate in areas of the country with relatively high benchmarks in relation 
to traditional Medicare. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra 
note 13, at 58-64.  However, this projection does not take into account the trend in health 
plan reporting of enrollee risk. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83. 
 45. Kenneth E. Thorpe & Adam Atherly, Reforming Medicare: Impacts on Federal 
Spending and Choice of Health Plans, 2001 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W51, W54, available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w1.51v1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 46. See id. at W51-52 (“Under the current system, payments for M+C plans are 
unrelated to plans’ underlying costs.  Instead, payments are derived from costs in the fee-for-
service (FFS) sector.”); Berenson, supra note 32, at W72-73. 
 47. Dowd et al., supra note 42, at 120. 
 48. Id. 
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CBO’s recent study, Designing a Premium Support System for Medicare, 
confirms these analysts’ suspicions and explains why payment neutrality at 
the local level is an analytically flawed recommendation.49  In the study, 
CBO compared plans’ projected per capita costs of providing Medicare 
Parts A and B benefits as reported in their adjusted community rate (ACR) 
submissions, which project plan per capita revenue requirements for 
delivering Medicare’s covered benefits and the per capita costs adjusting for 
enrollees’ health status using the standard CMS approach.50  Put simply, the 
CBO data shows that plan costs do not vary geographically the same way 
traditional Medicare costs vary. 
This lack of correlation between variations in plan costs and traditional 
Medicare spending should come as no surprise if one considers the major 
components of costs: administrative costs, price of services, and utilization 
of services.  Health plan costs mainly consist of administrative costs, 
including profit and reserves, and payments to providers for medical care.51  
Medical care costs are determined by prices paid for services and the 
volume of services provided.52 
CBO found that plans’ “[a]dministrative costs . . . account for about 11 
percent of private plans’ costs of delivering Medicare benefits, whereas the 
administrative costs of the [traditional] Medicare program . . . account for 
less than 2 percent of its expenditures.”53  Although there may be some 
variable cost in the 11%, perhaps associated with the volume of services 
provided (e.g., costs of claims administration, medical management, or 
marketing in a competitive environment), a reasonable assumption is that 
most of the administrative costs do not vary in relation to geographic 
 
 49. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 10, 42 tbl.5-2 (finding the bids plans submitted for 2006 produced similar 
ratios of costs to FFS spending as ACR filings, so that the basic findings do not appear 
affected by the absence of ACRs, which provide detail on projected plan costs, and that plan 
bids appear to reflect plans’ underlying costs in the same way that formal ACR submissions 
do). 
 51. See CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 12. 
Staff and group model HMOs, such as Kaiser-Permanente, typically employ or own some or 
all of the providers in the network and, therefore, demonstrate a different cost structure. Most 
MA enrollment is in other health insurance models in which the insurer pays contracting 
providers for medical care provided. 
 52. The Government Accountability Office developed a method for disaggregating 
medical expenses between prices paid to providers and the use of services by enrollees in the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. This approach might be applied to determining 
benchmarks for MA plan bidding. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH 
BENEFITS PROGRAM: COMPETITION AND OTHER FACTORS LINKED TO WIDE VARIATION IN HEALTH 
CARE PRICES app. I, at 32-48 (2005), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d05856.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2007). 
 53. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 12. 
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variations in traditional program spending.54  In other words, most of the 
administrative costs represent a fixed dollar commitment to supporting MA 
products, invariant of geographic factors. 
With regard to payment rates for services, the prices paid by private 
plans to hospitals and physicians are actually “higher in rural and small 
metropolitan areas than in large metropolitan areas.”55  One study 
conducted for MedPAC found that “the rates paid to physicians by private 
plans are an average of 30 percent higher than Medicare’s FFS rates in 
small metropolitan areas and rural areas, 10 percent higher in medium-
sized metropolitan areas, and 1 percent higher in large metropolitan 
areas.”56 
This inverse relationship between size of geographic area and prices 
makes perfect sense based on the Center for Studying Health System 
Change (HSC) findings about market dynamics.57  In recent years, hospitals, 
to a great extent, and physicians, to a lesser extent, have developed 
strategies, including restraining capacity growth, to gain bargaining 
leverage.58  In comparison to providers in competitive urban areas, 
providers in rural and smaller urban areas with little provider competition 
have an upper hand in negotiating with plans.59 
The situation is very different regarding service utilization.  Health plans 
(except for group- and staff-model health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) such as Kaiser) largely inherit the provider community’s practice 
patterns.60  Furthermore, plans have an enhanced opportunity to reduce 
spending in higher spending areas by applying managed care techniques, 
such as selective contracting based on physician profiling and prior 
authorization.61  For purposes of this article, the main point is that it is 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 13. 
 56. Id. (citing Dyckman & Associates, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Survey of 
Health Plans Concerning Physician Fees and Payment Methodology (2003), available at 
www.medpac.gov/publications/contractor_reports/Aug03_PhysPaySurvey(cont)Rpt.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2007) (Although this data is not specific to health plans’ MA products, it is 
likely that prices vary similarly for these products as well, with the artificially produced PFFS 
prices.)). 
 57. See Paul B. Ginsberg, Competition in Health Care: Its Evolution Over the Past 
Decade, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1512, 1518-19 (2005), available at www.healthaffairs.org/RWJ/ 
Ginsburg_05.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (analyzing the HSC’s observations of healthcare 
market forces). 
 58. Id. at 1518. 
 59. Id. 
 60. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 13. 
 61. Id. 
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reasonable to expect a positive correlation between plan and traditional 
Medicare utilization patterns, as the CBO has found.62 
The CBO analysis showed that MA plans’ bids vary less from county to 
county than does per capita traditional program spending.63  As a result, in 
areas with high traditional program per capita costs, MA plans’ costs are 
relatively low compared with traditional program spending and vice versa.64  
In particular, in areas with the highest traditional program spending, both 
the benchmarks against which plans bid and the plans’ actual bids deviate 
from the idea of financial neutrality at the local county level.65  In these 
areas, bids are about 8% above traditional Medicare spending, while in the 
lowest-cost traditional program areas, bids are about 21% above traditional 
program spending.66 
The benchmarks against which MA plans bid do not reflect cost 
differences faced by local plans due to local market factors, but, rather, are 
artifacts of the specific cost factors faced by the traditional Medicare 
program.67  By analyzing the variations in costs as represented by plan bids, 
benchmarks can be set that more closely replicate the actual costs plans 
face. 
Although actual plans’ bids might reflect strategic considerations in 
some cases,  for purposes of the analyzing relative bids across geographic 
areas, plan bids reflect the costs of efficiently providing Medicare benefits. 68  
By reviewing bids for all MA plans, except PFFS, for all counties, one can 
determine how plan costs vary geographically and how well that variation 
correlates with the variation in spending at the county level in traditional 
Medicare.69 
If plan costs, as reflected in their bids, do in fact vary in the same way 
that traditional program county-level spending varies, but, say, are only half 
as much as traditional program costs, one could construct benchmarks 
 
 62. Id. at 11 tbl.2-1. 
 63. Id. at 11. 
 64. Id. 
 65. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 9, 11. 
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. See Berenson, supra note 32, at W76-77 (discussing the linkage between M+C and 
the traditional program in determining payments to M+C plans). 
 68. See Bryan Dowd et al., A Tale of Four Cities: Medicare Reform and Competitive 
Pricing, 19 HEALTH AFF. 9, 10 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/19/5/9.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that the theory behind competitive 
pricing is that plans tell the government how much it costs to care for Medicare beneficiaries). 
 69. One would likely exclude PFFS plans from this calculation because of their legislated 
privilege of imposing Medicare prices on providers, thereby artificially altering the local market 
conditions—and costs—that all other MA plans face.  See infra notes 204–12 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of deeming. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:5 
based 50% on the national per capita spending amount and 50% on 
county-level spending.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) used a 
blend in moving away from county-level payment neutrality, which was the 
basis for pre-BBA payments.70  However, the BBA’s 50-50 blend was 
selected arbitrarily and not based on the type of analysis proposed here. 
Similarly, the county-level payment floors, which are embedded in 
benchmark calculations and have dramatically raised benchmarks and, 
thus, payments in low traditional Medicare payment areas, were set 
arbitrarily without reference to actual costs that plans in those areas face.71  
In the hypothetical 50-50 blend between national and county-level rates, the 
so-called floor counties would have benchmarks set above the pre-BBA 
payment equivalence levels but below the unjustifiably high levels the BBA 
produced.72 
III.  FAVORABLE SELECTION 
Numerous studies over nearly two decades have documented that 
private plans attract healthier-than-average Medicare beneficiaries.  The 
evidence comes from papers showing that Medicare beneficiaries in private 
HMOs used fewer services before enrolling and had lower mortality rates 
and imputed fee-for-service costs while in the plans; and beneficiaries who 
disenrolled from the plans had higher use and mortality rates than both 
people who remained in plans and those in traditional Medicare.73  In 
general, if plans “attract healthier-than-average beneficiaries, the Medicare 
program pays more than these same beneficiaries would cost in the 
[traditional] program.”74 
 
 70. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000). It is possible, although 
unlikely, that the kind of analysis recommended here would show an inconsistent relationship 
between health plan costs and traditional Medicare spending levels. If that were the case, any 
approach that tied plan bids to traditional program benchmarks, whether the current system, 
MedPAC’s preferred approach, or the one proposed here, would be problematic. A different 
approach in which benchmarks were set as a function of plan bids only would seem to be 
indicated. 
 71. See CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 9. 
 72. This provides an analytic approach to accomplishing the objective that the Physician 
Payment Review Commission had in recommending a blended payment in their 1997 Report.  
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 40, at 65-67. 
 73. See, e.g., RANDALL BROWN ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH INC., THE MEDICARE 
RISK PROGRAM FOR HMOS: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION (1993); 
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-161, MEDICARE+CHOICE: PAYMENTS EXCEED COST 
OF FEE-FOR-SERVICE BENEFITS, ADDING BILLIONS TO SPENDING (2000), available at 
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00161.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2007). 
 74. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 211 (also arguing that 
the opportunity to attract enrollees of varying health status is inequitable among competing 
plans). 
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The BBA authorized CMS to develop a risk-adjustment mechanism to 
adjust payments to plans not only for demographic factors such as age and 
gender, but also for the underlying health status of patients.75  CMS chose 
to adopt the Hierarchical Condition Codes (HCC) model, which uses 
diagnoses recorded on claim forms and submitted by MA plans to CMS and 
a given year’s demographic characteristics to assign each beneficiary a risk 
score measuring his or her predicted expenditures in the following year 
relative to the national average.76 
Inadequate risk adjustment distorts competition between private plans 
and the traditional Medicare program because “spending is highly 
concentrated in a relatively small proportion of the beneficiary 
population.”77  While risk adjustment has helped level the playing field by 
making plan payments more appropriate for the level of health risk their 
enrollees manifest, there are ongoing concerns that the HCC model under-
adjusts for health status disparity, and that, consequently, plans will still 
receive excessive payments as long as they continue to attract relatively 
healthy beneficiaries.78  As discussed below, plans can do a number of 
things, such as engage in certain market strategies, to continue to attract 
relatively healthier beneficiaries or encourage sicker ones to leave the 
program. 
Whether plans are now attracting a sicker population as they care for a 
larger percentage of beneficiaries is not clear.  The CBO stated that 
between 2003 and 2004, “the average risk score for enrollees in private 
plans increased significantly relative to the average risk score for 
beneficiaries in the [traditional] program.”79  This increase happened “even 
though there was little change during that period in the composition of the 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 10. 
 77.   Id. at 26.  For example, in 2004, 43% of annual Medicare spending was 
attributable to the top 5% of beneficiaries and 15.5% of spending to the top 1% of 
beneficiaries.  Gerald F. Riley, Long-Term Trends in the Concentration of Medicare Spending, 
26 HEALTH AFF. 808, 810 (2007). 
 78.   MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A 
MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM 43-44, 52-53 (2005), available at www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/June05_Entire_report.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, ISSUES 
IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM].  This report found that although the current risk 
adjuster used by CMS is a major improvement over using demographic factors in adjusting 
payments to plans for the varying underlying health of enrollees, it still leaves room for 
improvement. The risk adjustment model that CMS uses “overpredicts the costliness of 
beneficiaries who are in good health and underpredicts for those who are in poor health,” 
therefore maintaining the incentive for plans to seek to enroll relatively healthy Medicare 
beneficiaries disproportionately.  Id. at 53. 
 79. CBO, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 10. 
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private plans that participate in Medicare or in their enrollment.”80  Risk 
scores for MA plan “enrollees estimated from 2003 data were about 12 
percent lower than risk scores for enrollees in the [traditional] program, on 
average,” but using 2004 data the scores narrowed to approximately 6%.81 
Why MA plan risk scores are increasing is unknown.  As CBO and 
MedPAC stated, “[p]rivate plans may have become better at collecting and 
reporting diagnostic information on their enrollees” because they receive 
additional dollars in so doing.82  If this is the case, the increasing risk scores 
and increased payments might not actually be justified; although, plans 
surely have a right to improve their documentation and data submissions to 
CMS.83  The complexity of the risk adjustment mechanics requires CMS to 
make numerous operational policy decisions related to difficult issues of 
data collection and validity, statistical complexity, and potentially different 
coding practices among plans and providers in the traditional Medicare 
program,84 which together determine the financial impact of risk adjustment 
on plans.85 
In 2002, CMS made an administrative decision to not take savings from 
the phased-in implementation of risk adjustment in 2003 and to extend that 
policy for subsequent years when the savings to the government would have 
been more substantial as the risk adjustment was being phased in and more 
beneficiaries were enrolling in MA plans.86  Such operational decisions can 
determine whether plan payments are adjusted to current risk adjustment 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.; see also MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 212 
(suggesting that the risk adjustment may be higher than the true risk selection difference 
because of coding issues). 
 83.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 requires that CMS compare the diagnostic coding 
patterns of private plans and providers submitting claims in the traditional program, and if 
important differences are found, appropriately adjust the payments to plans.  Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 48 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23). 
 84. GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21, at 2. 
 85. For example, in calculating plan payments, “CMS has to decide what cohort of plans 
have submitted acceptable data on which to base risk scores; whether to adjust payment rates 
for trends in coding practices in traditional Medicare (so-called [fee-for-service] 
normalization); and whether to use lagged or nonlagged data to calculate risk scores.”  
Berenson, supra note 23, at W4-578. 
 86. Id.; see also, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
BENCHMARKS AND PAYMENTS COMPARED WITH AVERAGE MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE SPENDING 3 
(2006), available at www.medpac.gov/publications/other_reports/MedPAC_briefs_MA_ 
relative_payment.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter MEDPAC, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
BENCHMARKS] (stating that this adjustment to not take savings from implementation or risk 
adjusted payments has now been “scheduled to fall over time as a result of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005”). 
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mechanisms’ maximum potential or, rather, to constitute a discretionary 
source of plan overpayments, intentionally tilting the playing field.87 
IV.  GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN BENEFITS OFFERINGS 
Decisions by beneficiaries to leave traditional Medicare for an MA plan 
are “driven primarily by the desire for lower premiums or more 
comprehensive benefits . . . not because [MA plans] are preferred as a 
system of care.”88  The attraction is related to the significant benefits gaps in 
Parts A, B, and now D of traditional Medicare.  In particular, the traditional 
program has substantial cost sharing in the form of premiums, hospital 
deductibles, and co-insurance for Part B services, such as physician visits, 
and lacks coverage that limits beneficiary exposure to catastrophic 
expenses.89  MA plans bidding below the applicable benchmark are able to 
provide benefits to enrollees by reducing Parts A and B cost sharing, 
reducing the Parts B and D premiums, enhancing Part D benefits, and 
providing other benefits, such as vision and hearing screening.90 
Other parties attempt to provide complementary insurance to fill in the 
gaps in traditional Medicare.  According to MedPAC, currently “[a]bout 90 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries obtained supplemental coverage in 2003 
through former employers (33 percent), [M]edigap policies (25 percent), 
 
 87. The administrative decision to forgo savings for favorable selection into plans from 
application of the risk-adjustment methodology was never subject to notice, comment rule-
making, or even posted on the CMS Web site, but rather was announced by CMS 
Administrator Thomas Scully at a public meeting with health plans.  Berenson, supra note 23, 
at W4-584 n.29.  Called the budget neutrality or hold-harmless provision, the Republican 
Congress decided to ratify the administrative decision but to phase it out over four years 
beginning in 2007.  See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2117-19 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-115).  
Some argue that authority for not taking the savings from plans for favorable selection derives 
from congressional report language for the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999.  
MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 211. 
 88. Karen Davis et al., Medicare Extra:  A Comprehensive Benefit Option for Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W5-442, W5-452, (citing CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., 
KAISER/COMMONWEALTH FUND 1997 SURVEY OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (1998), available at 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/medicare_survey97_308.pdf?section=4039 (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2007)). 
 89. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE (Feb. 
2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-10.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 90. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  INCREASING THE 
VALUE OF MEDICARE 208 fig.9-2 (2006), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
Jun06_EntireReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007) (showing that in 2006 MA plans used 
about 65% of what they retain from bidding below benchmarks to reduce Parts A and B cost 
sharing, 14% to provide additional benefits, 11% to reduce Part D premiums, 5% to enhance 
Part D benefits, and 4% to reduce Part B premiums). 
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Medicare Advantage plans (13 percent), Medicaid (16 percent), or other 
programs (2 percent).”91 
The MMA partly addresses Medicare benefit gaps by providing a modest 
prescription drug benefit under Part D.92  According to the authors of 
Medicare Extra: A Comprehensive Benefit Option for Medicare Beneficiaries, 
One of the key structural decisions made in enacting the law was to offer 
prescription drug coverage only through private plans, either stand-alone 
private drug insurance plans or . . . MA managed care plans.  This decision 
marks the first time in the program’s history that a Medicare benefit will not 
be available though the basic program.  With the new, separate Part D drug 
benefit, beneficiaries wishing to remain in the traditional fee-for-service . . . 
program and still have comprehensive coverage will now need three 
separate plans: basic Medicare Parts A and B, for hospital and physician 
services; Part D, a private prescription drug plan; and supplemental private 
coverage to help cover Medicare’s high cost sharing and protect against 
catastrophic costs.93 
The patchwork of plans has the potential to create confusion and 
adverse selection as healthier beneficiaries select MA plans.94  It can also 
lead to higher administrative expenses because of the multiple 
administrative entities involved and the lack of integrated claims 
administration.95  By requiring beneficiaries to receive prescription drug 
coverage from a private insurer, the MMA replaced the previous “two-stop 
shopping” with “three-stop shopping” for beneficiaries who otherwise are 
satisfied to stay in traditional Medicare.96  Under the MMA, Medigap 
insurers can renew policies providing prescription drug benefits only to 
beneficiaries who decline to enroll in Part D and cannot issue new 
prescription drug benefit policies.97  Thus, these limitations on prescription 
drug coverage in the long-standing Medigap supplemental market actually 
reduce choice for beneficiaries. 
Some architects of the MMA specifically worked to accentuate then-
existing structural advantages given to private plans.  In his 2003 State of 
 
 91. MEDPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 2007, supra note 2, at 6.  Note that the 
percentage of beneficiaries in MA has increased from 13% in 2003 to 20% in July 2007. See 
supra text accompanying note 15. 
 92. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101 – 152 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 93. Davis et al., supra note 88, at W5-442. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at W5-442 to W5-443 (citing MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS: ASSESSING MEDICARE BENEFITS (2002), available at www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/Jun02_Entire%20report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007)). 
 96. Berenson, supra note 23. 
 97.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(v) (Supp. IV 2004).   
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the Union address, President Bush proposed that beneficiaries could receive 
comprehensive prescription drug benefits only if they joined a private plan; 
those remaining in traditional Medicare would not receive as generous of 
coverage.98  This proposal explicitly favored private plans.  Although the tilt 
was politically unsustainable, the actual MMA language still provides a very 
real opportunity for private plans to exploit advantages the system’s structure 
afforded them by offering one-stop shopping and using the overpayments 
they receive to offer extra benefits. 
Because the same private plans offering Medicare Advantage also are 
offering the stand-alone drug benefit, including prominent insurers like 
UnitedHealth Group, WellPoint, and Humana, some beneficiaries will likely 
find it simpler to just let the same insurer provide all their care, including 
their basic Medicare benefits.  Humana has forthrightly acknowledged this 
advantage.  With its already large presence in both Parts C and D of 
Medicare, Humana has developed a “near national” strategy for reaching 
virtually all Medicare beneficiaries with a stand-alone drug plan.99  Its goal 
is to “ultimately migrate those customers” to more profitable MA plans,100 
thereby promoting the simplicity of one-stop shopping.101 
The obvious policy approach to leveling the playing field between MA 
plans and traditional Medicare in terms of benefit offerings would be to 
allow traditional Medicare to offer catastrophic coverage and a Part D plan 
directly and to improve coverage of beneficiary cost sharing so that 
beneficiaries could have one-stop shopping in the traditional program.102  
Even if premiums increased substantially to accommodate an expanded 
benefit package, allowing traditional Medicare to offer benefits comparable 
to what MA plans provide would present a “genuine market test” and fair 
choice.103 
 
 98. George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union, (Jan. 28, 2003), at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited Sept. 30, 
2007).  President Bush subsequently proposed a plan that would have provided beneficiaries 
on traditional Medicare with an estimated 10% to 25% savings on prescription drugs and 
protection from high out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses.  Press Release, White House, 
President Announces Framework to Modernize and Improve Medicare (Mar. 4, 2003), at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030304-5.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 99.  MARSHA GOLD, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRIVATE PLANS IN MEDICARE: A 
2007 UPDATE 10 (2007), available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7622.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2007). 
 100.  Berenson, supra note 18, at 15 (quoting Humana’s Chief Executive Officer Mike 
McAllister on the rationale for the aggressive strategy to sell Part D stand-alone products). 
 101.  See infra notes 136-141 and accompanying text for evidence of marketing abuses 
associated with this migration strategy. 
 102. Davis et al., supra note 88, at W5-450. 
 103. Id. at W5-452. 
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Analysis suggests that a so-called Part E of Medicare, which represents a 
comprehensive benefit option and eliminates the need for beneficiaries to 
purchase a private drug plan and Medigap supplemental coverage, is 
reasonably economical and would not increase federal costs if supported by 
a budget-neutral beneficiary premium.104  Yet, architects of the MMA, who 
created the extra payments and structural advantages that MA plans rely on, 
act as if the inadequate Medicare benefit package is immutable.  This 
assumption underlies their arguments in favor of sustaining the un-level 
playing field.  For example, Senator Charles Grassley, who was Chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee when the MMA was enacted, recently 
argued why private plans should be favored.  He stated, 
  The original Medicare benefit is set up based on how medicine was 
practiced in 1964 . . . . 
  . . . Traditional fee-for-service Medicare, the Medicare since 1964, by 
itself does not provide protection against the cost of catastrophic illness.  
Some beneficiaries then buy Medigap insurance for this catastrophic 
insurance.  Medigap insurance can be expensive for those on fixed incomes.  
In contrast, . . . Medicare Advantage plans have catastrophic coverage for 
those seniors who want to choose it, and they do it for a much lower 
premium than the Medigap add-on to traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare.105 
Noting that MA plans now serve rural areas and have helped rural 
beneficiaries, Senator Grassley commented that an important reason to 
favor private plans is to create “rural equity.”106  Yet, this entire argument 
assumes that traditional Medicare needs to remain in its original 1965 
benefit structure.  The obvious solution is not one that Republicans support, 
hence their self-fulfilling rationale for tilting the playing field. 
V.  ACTUARIAL EQUIVALENCE 
As already discussed, MA plans are allowed to buy down beneficiary 
cost sharing with extra payments they receive above their bids.  In addition, 
plan benefits do not have to strictly follow cost sharing amounts required in 
 
 104. Id. at W5-447 tbl.3.  Although Part E could be constructed to not add incremental 
federal costs, more of the costs would be “on-budget,” thereby contributing to political 
opposition to such an approach. 
 105. Senator Charles Grassley, Senate Floor Speech Following Passage of H.R. 976 
Congressional Record article 21 of 83, at s10762-s10763 (Aug. 2, 2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S10762&dbname 
=2007_record (last visited Jan. 19, 2008). 
 106. Id. at s10763. 
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the traditional program.107  The benefit packages that plans offer must be 
“at least as good as Medicare’s and cover everything Medicare covers, but 
they do not have to cover every benefit in the same way.”108  Rather, subject 
to CMS review, plans have some flexibility in making their benefits 
actuarially equivalent, but not identical, to traditional Medicare benefits so 
long as the cost sharing alterations do not result in discrimination on the 
basis of health status.109  There have been a few notable instances of cost 
sharing that seemed designed to dissuade beneficiaries with particular costly 
health problems from enrolling in MA plans or to encourage enrollees to 
disenroll because of the substantial out-of-pocket liabilities associated with 
their health problems.110  Less is known about whether plans use this 
flexibility to systematically determine actuarial equivalence in an attempt to 
attract and retain healthier beneficiaries.111 
Out-of-pocket spending for plan enrollees with particular health 
problems seems to vary greatly from other enrollees’ spending.  A recent 
Commonwealth Study found that out-of-pocket costs for private plan 
members vary widely by health status and plan benefit package.112  The 
report shows that in nineteen of eighty-eight MA plans reviewed, out-of-
pocket costs for plan members in poor health would actually have been 
higher than in traditional Medicare.113 
MedPAC’s examination of the issue a few years earlier was inconclusive.  
On the one hand, MedPAC found that most of the time, the plans’ ability to 
provide extra benefits resulted in reduced cost sharing compared with 
 
 107. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE FINE PRINT IN MEDICARE PRIVATE 
HEALTH PLAN BENEFITS 3 (2007), available at www.medicarerights.org/MA_care_problems.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2007). 
 108. Id. 
 109. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 4; see 42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 110. See, e.g., Status of the Medicare+Choice Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 53 (2001) (Statement of 
Stephanie Sue Stein, Dir., Milwaukee County Dep’t on Aging, Area Agency on Aging for 
Milwaukee County, Wis.) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi? 
IPaddress=162.140.64.181&filename=77455.pdf&directory=/diska/wais/data/107_house_
hearings (discussing UnitedHealthcare’s announcement that it would increase the inpatient 
hospital deductible from zero dollars to $350 per day for Milwaukee Medicare+Choice 
beneficiaries). 
 111. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that 
the MMA required MedPAC to conduct a study of the issue). 
 112. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE BENEFICIARY OUT-OF-POCKET 
COSTS: ARE MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS A BETTER DEAL?, 2 (May 2006), available at 
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/927_Biles_MedicarebeneOOPcosts_MA_ib.pdf? 
section4039 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 113. Id. at 7. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
26 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:5 
traditional Medicare (e.g., for primary care visits).114  However, MedPAC 
identified a pattern of plans charging higher cost sharing for self-labeled 
“non-discretionary” services associated with established serious conditions, 
such as chemotherapy,115 or post-acute care services, such as home health 
and skilled nursing.116  In one example, a colo-rectal cancer patient’s 
charges for chemotherapy varied from $7,100 under one plan, to $1,990 
under a second plan, and $6,500 under a third plan.117  Furthermore, in a 
recent study, the American Medical Association found “[m]ore than half of 
the physicians report that their patients in a[n MA] HMO or PPO plan were 
denied coverage of services typically covered in the traditional Medicare 
plan.”118 
As one focus of its plan oversight activities, CMS reviews benefit 
packages with altered cost sharing.  MedPAC recommended that CMS’s 
review activities be increased and that CMS be given greater negotiation 
authority over the specific benefits provided in benefit packages and more 
resources to ensure that biased selection does not occur.119  Nevertheless, 
beneficiary advocacy groups continue to argue that “[e]ven with enhanced 
payments, private health plans often fail to deliver coverage that a patient 
could obtain from Original Medicare.”120 
The issue of whether plans skimp on the care they provide because they 
are permitted to offer actuarially equivalent, but not identical, benefits is 
important primarily because of the need to protect beneficiaries from 
extraordinary costs during illnesses.121  However, to the extent that plans are 
able to dissuade certain patients from enrolling in the first place or to 
encourage them to disenroll when they develop particularly expensive health 
problems, this flexibility in whom plans attract based on benefits they offer 
also tilts the playing field.122  As noted, risk adjustment currently is an 
imperfect approach to addressing the problem.123 
 
 114. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 24. 
 115. See id. at 12. 
 116. See Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 110th Congress 4 (2007) (statement of the Center for Medicare Advocacy, 
Inc.), available at www.medicareadvocacy.org/MA_03.26.07.TestimonyOnMAPlans.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 117. MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 12. 
 118. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Calls for Financial Neutrality in Medicare 
Advantage (May 22, 2007), at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/17602.html (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 119. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 37. 
 120. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 107, at 9. 
 121. See MEDPAC, BENEFIT DESIGN AND COST SHARING REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. 
 122. See id. at 30 (noting that disenrollment rates typically have averaged between 10% 
and 13%; although, this data is from a period when beneficiaries could disenroll on a monthly 
basis).  In 2002, the most common reason for disenrollment related to out-of-pocket costs for 
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VI.  THE ABILITY TO MARKET THEIR PRODUCTS 
The traditional Medicare program has an immeasurable and important 
advantage over private plans because it has been in operation since 1965, 
enjoys a good reputation with beneficiaries and the public, and is the 
“default” program that beneficiaries participate in if they do not enroll in 
MA.  CMS provides a Handbook124 to all beneficiaries, which includes the 
general choices between traditional Medicare and the variety of private 
plans and is supposed to provide a neutral presentation.  Medicare’s Web 
site contains detailed information that beneficiaries and their families can 
use as an aid in choosing between MA plans and traditional Medicare and 
among the various private plans that are available in specific geographic 
areas.125 
Members of Congress have complained over the past few years that the 
materials provided by CMS are confusing and biased in favor of private 
plans.126  For example, in 2005, several Congressmen expressed concern 
that the 2005 Handbook grouped PFFS plans and traditional Medicare in 
the same section and failed to accurately explain the differences between 
traditional Medicare and MA plans.127  More recently, Senators complained 
of CMS bias in the 2007 Handbook, which states that traditional Medicare 
may be more expensive than MA plans but omits that MA plans may have 
 
plan premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. (These data are from a period when plans 
were reducing benefits and do not reflect the recent increase in payments that permits more 
generous benefit packages.)  Id. 
 123. See MEDPAC, ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE PROGRAM, supra note 78, at 53. 
 124. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE & 
YOU (2007), available at www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
 125. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medicare: Overview (Apr. 20, 2007), at 
www.medicare.gov/Choices/overview.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2007). 
 126. Press Release, U.S. Cong., ‘Medicare and You’ Guide Skews Advice to Seniors (Oct. 
25, 2006), available at www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Bpress/2005press/prb102506.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Press Release, U.S. Senate, Comm. on Fin., Baucus Criticizes 
Agency Bias Toward Private Medicare Coverage (May 25, 2007), available at 
www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Bpress/2007press/prb052507.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 
2007) (noting that Senator Baucus recently reiterated these concerns). 
 127. Letter from Charles B. Rangel, Ranking Member, Comm. on Ways and Means, John 
Dingell, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Henry A. Waxman, Ranking 
Member, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Fortney Pete Stark, Ranking Member, Comm. on Ways 
and Means, Subcomm. on Health, & Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health to Mark B. McClellan, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 26, 2005), available at www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/letters/ 
2006%20Handbook%20Letter%20PDF.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
28 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:5 
higher cost sharing on a regular basis and significantly higher costs for 
critical services such as hospital care.128 
Because of (1) the presumption of enrollment in traditional Medicare, (2) 
the supposed objectivity of the Handbook and other information provided by 
CMS to beneficiaries, and (3) the need for private plans to distinguish their 
own MA plans from those of competitors, it is understandable and 
reasonable that private plans actively market their plans and rely on media 
advertising and other outlets to inform beneficiaries of the potential 
advantages of plan enrollment.  Yet, for a number of reasons, MA plans 
enjoy several advantages that go beyond the ability to encourage 
enrollment by informing beneficiaries about private plan options in general 
and the merits of their company’s own plans. 
As noted earlier, private plans offer two types of plans: stand-alone Part 
D prescription drug plans and Part C MA plans.  Many insurers sponsor 
both129 and, therefore, can gain special access to Medicare beneficiaries 
through their Part D offerings.  Some companies specifically strategize to 
actively recruit beneficiaries for their prescription drug plans in the hope that 
they will later move to the company’s more profitable MA plans.130  The 
traditional program, on the other hand, remains a passive bystander 
because it is not permitted to offer a drug plan directly other than through 
private plans.131 
The overpayments to MA plans create strong incentives for insurance 
companies to sell these plans instead of other Medicare products (including 
Part D plans).  MA plans bring in more income than stand-alone drug 
plans132 and have higher profit margins.133  To encourage agents to sell MA 
plans, insurers pay commissions for MA plans that are five to eight times 
higher than what they pay for stand-alone drug plans.134  The financial 
 
 128. See U.S. Cong., supra note 126; see also U.S. Senate, Comm. on Fin., supra note 
126. 
 129. See GOLD, supra note 99, at 15. 
 130. Milt Freudenheim, A Benefit for Insurers: Medicare Drug Plan Feeds More Profitable 
Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1 (noting Humana director’s 
acknowledgement of his company’s “springboard” policy, saying, “There's [sic] going to be a 
lot of people that are going to have Part D cards that are going to become interested in a 
Medicare Advantage plan.”). 
 131. Lieberman, supra note 17, at 16. 
 132. See id. at 17 (noting that, on average, Humana’s stand-alone drug plans cost 
beneficiaries about $100 a year, compared with about $800 for its MA plans). 
 133. Freudenheim, supra note 130 (noting that Humana estimated its profit margin for 
stand-alone drug plans was between 1% and 3%, while its profit margins for MA plans were 
between 3% and 5%). 
 134. DAVID LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES & MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., AFTER THE 
GOLDRUSH: THE MARKETING OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE AND PART D PLANS 5 (2007), available at 
www.cahealthadvocates.org/_pdf/advocacy/2007/CHA-MRC-Brief-AfterTheGoldrush-2007-
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incentive created by this commission structure, combined with lax 
government enforcement of regulations regarding the marketing and selling 
of these plans,135 has created an environment conducive to deceptive 
practices bordering on fraud. 
Shortly after marketing began in fall 2005 for MA plans that included 
the new prescription drug benefit, the government began to receive 
complaints about aggressive marketing.136  A news article in January 2006, 
which described the financial incentives Humana gave its agents to sell MA 
plans instead of stand-alone drug plans, prompted Representative Pete Stark 
to ask CMS to enforce its own guidelines and prevent abusive marketing of 
the plans.137  At that time, the guidelines prohibited the payment of a higher 
commission based on the value of the plan to the sponsor.138  Now, 
however, the guidelines acknowledge that higher commissions are paid 
based on the volume or value of an agent’s sales and require only that 
commissions be based on industry standards and related to the agent’s time 
spent marketing the plan.139  Nevertheless, the “rate of payment to a 
marketing representative should not vary based on the health status or risk-
profile of a beneficiary.”140  These changed guidelines seem to imply that 
CMS no longer prohibits higher payments for plans that generate higher 
 
01.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Robert Pear, Oklahoma Chides Insurer in Medicare 
Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A14 (noting that Humana pays agents five 
times as much commission for selling an MA plan as for selling a prescription drug plan). 
 135. See LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 12. 
 136. Robert Pear, Insurers’ Tactics in Marketing Drug Plan Draw Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2005, at Section 1, 33. 
 137. Press Release, Pete Stark, U.S. Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, Stark 
Calls for Immediate Investigation of Humana and Other Medicare Drug Plans (Jan. 26, 
2006), at www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/pressreleases/01-26Humana.htm (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
 138. Letter from Fortney Pete Stark, U.S. Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, to 
Mark McClellan, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., and Daniel R. Levinson, 
Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., (Jan. 26, 2005), available at 
www.house.gov/stark/news/109th/letters/20060126_McClellan_Levison_Humana.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2007) (according to Stark’s January 26, 2005 letter to CMS Administrator 
Mark McClellan, the 2005 guidelines stated: “The commission rate (i.e., the percentage per 
enrollment) should not vary based on the value of the business generated for the Plan Sponsor 
paying the commission (e.g., profitability of the book of business).”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES FOR: MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS (MAS), 
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS (MA-PDS), PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS (PDPS), 
AND 1876 COST PLANS 129 (2006), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrug 
CovContra/Downloads/FinalMarketingGuidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES]. 
 139. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138. 
 140. Id. 
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profits but does still forbid higher payments to agents based on the risk 
status of a beneficiary. 
Recent congressional hearings included testimony from state officials 
who have received thousands of complaints concerning abusive marketing 
practices by insurers and their agents selling MA plans.141  Beneficiaries 
have complained they were enrolled in MA plans without their knowledge or 
consent, threatened with loss of Medicare benefits unless they signed up for 
an MA plan, enrolled in an MA plan when they believed they had signed up 
for a stand-alone drug plan, or switched to an MA plan that was not 
appropriate for them, which sometimes led to higher premiums and cost 
sharing than under their previous coverage.142  Insurance agents selling MA 
plans have used aggressive marketing tactics such as door-to-door visits 
and cold calling, misrepresenting themselves and their products, and selling 
to individuals with limited English proficiency or mental impairments despite 
not being able to adequately communicate with them. 143  In a recent 
 
 141. See Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007), 
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Medicare 
Advantage.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Medicare Advantage Marketing & Sales: Who 
Has the Advantage?, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Congress 
(2007), at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=274320& (last visited Sept. 21, 
2007); Medicare Advantage and the Federal Budget, Hearing Before the H. Budget Comm., 
110th Congress (2007), at www.house.gov/budget_democrats/hearings.htm (last visited Sept. 
21, 2007). For example, Lee Harrell, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance for the State of 
Mississippi, testified that his agency had “received over 1,000 complaints on Medicare 
Advantage alone . . . .  These complaints represent at least twice as many complaints as we 
normally receive on all other topics combined.”  Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare 
Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 6 (2007), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ 
cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Harrell-Testimony.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
Harrell, Predatory Sales Hearing] (testimony of Lee Harrell, Deputy Commissioner of 
Insurance, State of Mississippi). 
 142. Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the  H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Congress 6-7 
(2007), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607. 
Lipschutz-testimony.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Lipschutz, Predatory Sales 
Hearing] (statement of David Lipschutz, California Health Advocates). 
 143. See id. at 5-9. CMS regulations prohibit door-to-door solicitation. 42 C.F.R. § 
422.80(e)(1)(iii) (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(f)(1)(iii). Regulations also require that companies 
provide materials in a foreign language when there is a significant non-English speaking 
population in the community.  42 C.F.R. § 422.80(c)(5); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(d)(5).  There 
have been many complaints of agents going door-to-door, as well as soliciting on the street, 
at nursing homes and community centers, and asking Medicare beneficiaries whom they are 
visiting to introduce the sales agent to other beneficiaries. See Medicare Advantage Marketing 
& Sales: Who Has the Advantage?, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 
110th Congress 4 (2007), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr174sd.pdf (last 
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survey, thirty-nine states (out of forty-one respondents) said they had 
received reports of misrepresentation in the marketing of MA plans, and 
twenty-two states reported complaints of outright fraud, such as forged 
signatures on plan applications.144 
PFFS plans, in particular, have been a magnet for fraud and abuse 
because they receive the highest overpayments (an average of 19% above 
traditional Medicare payments)145 and because beneficiaries can enroll in 
PFFS plans without drug benefits any time of year.146  The problems with 
PFFS plan marketing was so severe that seven sponsors signed an 
agreement with CMS in June 2007 to voluntarily suspend marketing those 
plans until corrective action was taken and fraud investigations were 
completed.147  Despite evidence of widespread abuse in the marketing of 
non-PFFS plans, no immediate restrictions have been placed on the 
marketing of other types of MA plans.148  CMS did propose new rules for 
voluntary reporting and enforcement of complaints,149 but recently 
announced that the seven plan sponsors who had signed the voluntary 
suspension agreement in June have been approved to resume marketing.150  
According to CMS Acting Administrator Kerry Weems, the agency conducted 
a comprehensive review of the sponsors and found substantial 
improvements in both their internal controls and oversight processes that 
 
visited Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Dilweg, Medicare Advantage Marketing Hearing] 
(testimony of Sean Dilweg, Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner). 
 144. Pear, supra note 134. 
 145. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 64; see 
also MARISSA GORDON PICARD, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRIVATE 
FEE-FOR-SERVICE (PFFS) PLANS: A PRIMER FOR ADVOCATES 25, available at 
www.medicareadvocacy.org/MA_PFFSPrimerForAdvocates.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2007); 
discussion of PFFS Plans infra Part VII. 
 146. JONATHAN BLUM ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., AN EXAMINATION OF 
MEDICARE PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS 2-3, www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7621.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 147. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
Plans Suspend PFFS Marketing: Plans Adopt Strict Guidelines in Response to Deceptive 
Marketing Practices (June 15, 2007), available at www.doi.ne.gov/notices/notc2007/ 
nr0720.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 148. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Proposes Reforms of 
Compliance Requirements for Medicare Advantage Plans: Provisions Also Extend to Part D 
Prescription Drug Plans (May 21, 2007), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/ 
press_releases.asp (follow “May 21, 2007” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Seven Medicare PFFS Plans 
are Approved Following Rigorous Marketing Review (Sept. 24, 2007) at www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=2474 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008). 
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were “consistent with regulations and guidance for Medicare private-fee-for-
service plans.”151   
In addition, when marketing began for the 2008 benefit year on 
October 1, 2007, all PFFS plans became subject to the same standards, 
which include, inter alia, requirements that brokers and agents selling the 
product pass a written exam to demonstrate an understanding of Medicare 
PFFS policies and the products being marketed and that lists of planned 
marketing and sales events must be provided to CMS so that CMS can 
monitor these events.152  The Agency has likewise promised more than a 
dozen new oversight activities of PFFS plans, including creation of a 
dedicated monitoring team and a comprehensive rapid-response plan, 
enrollment verifications by the Agency of new plan enrollees to ensure they 
were not subject to inappropriate marketing activities and understand the 
characteristics of a PFFS plan, and coordination with state insurance 
departments to share information about agent and broker complaints and 
license suspensions.153  Yet, despite these ameliorative actions, complaints 
continue to arise regarding marketing of PFFS plans.154 
CMS has issued regulations155 and guidance156 for marketing MA plans, 
and requires companies to submit marketing materials for approval before 
distributing them.157  Insurers are also prohibited from discriminating, or 
“cherry-picking,” among potential customers.158  However, Medicare’s 
structure gives them incentives to do exactly that, and the regulations and 
guidance allow practices that invite abuse and provide advantage.  For 
example, companies that sell stand-alone drug plans are allowed to market 
MA plans and other products, including non-health products, to 
beneficiaries seeking stand-alone drug plans.159  Therefore, when a 
beneficiary calls an agent or invites an agent into his or her home to discuss 
a prescription plan, the agent can take the opportunity to push an MA plan 
(which would result in a much higher commission for the agent) or any 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Robert Pear, For Recipients of Medicare, the Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2007, at  A1. 
 155. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (2007). 
 156. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138. 
 157. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80(a); 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(a). 
 158. 42 C.F.R. § 422.80(e)(1)(ii) (the regulations specifically ban discrimination); see also 
CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138 (discussing the fact that “[a]n 
individual performing marketing may be in a position to enroll healthier beneficiaries into 
specific health plans (or ‘cherry-pick’) . . . Therefore an individual performing marketing must 
not ‘cherry pick’”). 
 159. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 112-113. 
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number of other products.  Not only does this provide an opportunity for 
agents to use aggressive sales tactics,160 but it could allow the agent to 
market selectively, both at the time of initial enrollment and during later 
open enrollment periods. 
A potential advantage that plans have in offering both Part C and Part D 
products is the ability to “go to school” over the Part D data to better target 
Part C enrollment.  The CMS marketing guidelines have an express anti-
discrimination section that states that “[o]rganizations may not discriminate 
based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, health status, 
or geographic location within the service area.”161  However, there do not 
appear to be explicit prohibitions on plans taking advantage of prescription 
drug use patterns by beneficiaries to target enrollment.  Plans, for example, 
could research whether potential Part C enrollees use particularly costly 
medications or whether they are compliant with their prescribed drug 
regimens in the Part D plans that the same organizations administer.  
Specifically, there are no “fire walls” between Part D and Part C staff to 
assure that Part C plans do not gain unfair advantages in targeting 
enrollment.  Because CMS policing of this type of targeted marketing might 
be unrealistic in terms of the resources needed, a regulatory requirement 
that plans create such fire walls could be a workable solution to this 
particular problem. 
As incentives for potential customers to seek information about their 
plans, insurance companies are allowed to offer gifts (of up to $15 in value) 
and conduct raffles or contests for larger prizes in locations such as Wal-
Mart, as long as they are open to the general public.162  The choice of 
prizes may even be tailored to appeal to a particular group of people that 
the company believes is less likely to use healthcare services.163  Companies 
are also allowed to set up information booths at events such as health 
fairs,164 and may choose which events to participate in based on the types of 
people likely to attend the event.  Finally, companies may target a healthy 
population by including benefits that appeal to healthier seniors, such as 
discounts for health club memberships, or try to discourage sicker 
beneficiaries from enrolling by placing annual limits on coverage or 
 
 160. See LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 13 (noting that in-home sales visits have the 
highest closing rate for customer enrollments). 
 161. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 117. 
 162. See CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 24, 124. 
 163. See Lipschutz, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 142, at 17. 
 164. CMS, MEDICARE MARKETING GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at 121-22. 
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imposing high cost sharing for expensive “nondiscretionary” services such as 
chemotherapy.165 
CMS has been criticized for failing to curb MA marketing abuses until 
after Medicare advocacy groups and Congress brought the public’s 
attention to the issue,166 calling the Agency’s enforcement capabilities as 
well as its neutrality into question.  In recent months, however, CMS has 
taken action to address the aggressive and abusive marketing problems by 
entering into corrective action plans with some of the worst offenders and 
proposing new self-reporting requirements and plan-specific enforcement 
for companies who market MA plans.167  Despite this promising action, the 
enforcement is uneven.  For example, many reports of abuses by one insurer 
in Oklahoma did not result in corrective action by CMS.168  State officials 
have found “chronic and blatant disregard for state regulation and for 
senior policyholders,”169 but states’ hands are tied by the federal preemption 
of all state regulatory authority over MA plans, except for licensing and 
solvency requirements.170  As noted in recent congressional testimony, many 
of the misleading and fraudulent practices associated with the marketing of 
MA plans are tied to sales agents who are insufficiently trained and 
supervised171 and have a significant financial incentive to sell MA plans 
instead of Part D drug and Medigap plans.  Most recently, CMS revised the 
2008 version of its Handbook in an effort to be less biased in favor of MA 
plans.172  While the revisions do include information about cost sharing and 
 
 165. See MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 107, at 3; Medicare Advantage and the 
Federal Budget: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Congress (2007), 
available at www.house.gov/budget_democrats/hearings/2007/Hoven%20Testimony.pdf 
(statement of Ardis Hoven, Board of Trustees, American Medical Association ) (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2007). 
 166. DAVID LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES & THE MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR, THE 
RELUCTANT REGULATOR: CENTERS  FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES’ RESPONSE TO MARKETING 
MISCONDUCT BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS 1-3 (July 2007), available at 
www.cahealthadvocates.org/_pdf/advocacy/2007/CHA-MRC-Regulator-2007-07.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 167. Id. at 2-3; see also Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 
148. 
 168. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 7. 
 169. Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) 
(testimony of Kim Holland, Commissioner for the Oklahoma Insurance Department), available 
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Holland-Testimony.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Holland, Predatory Sales Hearing].  
 170. 42 C.F.R. § 422.402 (2007). 
 171. Harrell, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 141, at 2. 
 172. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE & 
YOU (2008), available at www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2008). 
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the fact that MA plans may be more expensive, the Handbook might still be 
criticized as misleading because it presents traditional Medicare as a “plan” 
alongside MA plans and states that costs vary by plan without making clear 
that costs for certain services, such as hospital care, might be much higher 
under an MA plan than traditional Medicare.173 
Medicare beneficiary advocacy groups have noted174 that part of the 
solution to this problem is to restore state regulatory authority over the 
marketing of MA plans, as state insurance commissioners have requested. 
175  As a result, on July 26, 2007, Senator Herb Kohl introduced legislation 
which would allow states to regulate the marketing and sales of MA plans 
and standardize marketing practices.176  Another part of the solution could 
be to require training and supervision of sales agents, who are often short-
term employees with little loyalty to the insurance company or to Medicare 
beneficiaries.  As stated above, CMS took a step in this direction by 
requiring all PFFS-plan sales agents to pass a written exam to demonstrate 
their understanding of Medicare policies.  Certainly, stronger enforcement 
of current regulations and guidelines would help, since prohibited sales 
practices continue to be reported. 
Relying on CMS’s regulatory and enforcement actions to stem the tide of 
MA marketing abuses would seem to be futile, despite the Agency’s recent 
actions.  As Representative Pete Stark, chair of the House Ways and Means 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Health, has stated, the move by insurance 
companies to voluntarily suspend marketing PFFS plans “will do virtually 
nothing to protect Medicare beneficiaries and is a pathetic attempt to pre-
empt Congressional action.”177  Indeed, some have criticized the agency for 
acting more as a cheerleader for MA plans than as a neutral regulatory 
agency overseeing them.178  However, the structural factors of overpayments 
and insurers’ ability to market MA plans form both the incentive for and the 
 
 173. See Jeffrey Young, Medicare Pamphlet Now Includes Caveats on Private Plan Benefits, 
THE HILL, Nov. 17, 2007, http://thehill.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id 
=69861 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008). 
 174. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 9. 
 175. See, e.g., Holland, Predatory Sales Hearing, supra note 169; Predatory Sales 
Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations 
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 8 (2007), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-oi-hrg.062607.Poolman-Testimony.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (testimony of Jim Poolman, North Dakota Insurance 
Commissioner); Dilweg, Medicare Advantage Marketing Hearing, supra note 143 
(recommending adopting the Medigap regulatory structure for MA plans). 
 176. Accountability and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of 2007, S. 1883, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
 177. Lieberman, supra note 17, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 178. LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 166, at 2. 
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base of the abuse, indicating that congressional action may be the only true 
means of rectifying the problem. 
VII.  THE SPECIAL CASE OF PRIVATE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PLANS 
In order to promote a variety of plan options, the MMA created a 
number of preferences for new forms of managed care other than the local 
HMO, which had been the staple of private plan contracting in Medicare for 
more than twenty years.179  Initial attention was placed on the incentives for 
what the MMA called regional preferred provider organizations (R-PPOs).180  
To encourage R-PPOs, the “MMA allow[ed] Medicare to share financial risk 
with sponsors in 2006 and 2007, provides selected provisions to make it 
easier to establish networks in rural areas, and establishes a regional 
stabilization fund starting in 2007 to encourage entry of new plans and 
retention of existing ones.”181  Also, the MMA sets forth a somewhat different 
approach to establishing the benchmarks that plans bid against by basing 
the calculations partly on the actual bids submitted by the R-PPOs.182  
Despite these provisions, R-PPOs have attracted a relatively small share of 
MA enrollment.183 
On the other hand, PFFS plans represent the greatest growth in the MA 
program despite receiving virtually no attention at the time the MMA was 
passed.184  Although PFFS plans were first authorized by the BBA in 1997,185 
insurers had little interest in offering them, and beneficiaries had little 
interest in enrolling in them.  Before the MMA was passed in 2003, PFFS 
plan enrollment hovered around 25,000.186  Enrollment has since exploded, 
 
 179. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 created the initial risk-
based program of contracting with private plans.  42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (2000). 
 180. The CBO and the CMS Office of the Chief Actuary’s (OACT) 2003 disagreement 
over the predicted MA enrollment centered on the likely impact of R-PPOs on beneficiary 
choice. OACT believed that there would be substantial R-PPO enrollment, while CBO thought 
new R-PPO enrollment would be negligible. See GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21. 
 181. GOLD, supra note 99, at 3.  R-PPOs must “serve large areas in the 26 defined 
regions comprising one or more states . . . [and] offer the same plan (with the same benefits 
and premiums) across the entire region.” Furthermore, they must structure benefits to integrate 
cost sharing for Parts A and B and to include an annual out-of-pocket limit on cost sharing for 
these benefits. R-PPOs are to be distinguished from local PPOs that are coordinated care 
plans able to serve individual counties, not large geographic areas.  Id. 
 182. MEDPAC, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE BENCHMARKS, supra note 86, at 1. 
 183. In July 2007, there were approximately 167,000 R-PPO enrollees.  Although the 
number had doubled from a year earlier, R-PPO enrollment represented only 2% of MA 
enrollment.  Peterson & Gold, supra note 16. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  42 U.S.C. §1395w-22 (2000). 
 186. Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007), at http://waysand 
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increasing from about 42,000 in September 2004, to 120,000 in July 
2005, to 764,000 in July 2006, to 1,661,000 in July 2007.187  Current 
PFFS enrollment represents 19% of total MA enrollment and nearly 4% of 
the Medicare beneficiary population.188  The CBO estimates that by 2017, 
enrollment in PFFS plans will reach 5 million and account for one-third of 
total MA enrollment.189 
A PFFS plan is an MA plan that 
(i) Pays providers of services at a rate determined by the plan on a fee-for-
service basis without placing the provider at financial risk; (ii) Does not vary 
the rates for a provider based on the utilization of that provider’s services; 
and (iii) Does not restrict enrollees’ choices among providers that are 
lawfully authorized to provide services and agree to accept the plan’s terms 
and conditions of payment.190 
The advantages enjoyed by PFFS plans greatly exceed the advantages 
described in this article for MA plans in general.  The same estimates that 
found 12% overpayment for MA plans in aggregate find that PFFS plans 
receive 19% more than the cost for covering the same beneficiaries under 
the traditional Medicare program, even though PFFS was designed to be a 
privately administered version of the traditional Medicare program.191  From 
 
means.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5965 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007) 
[hereinafter Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing] (statement of Patricia Neuman, Vice-
President, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Director, Medicare Policy Project).  The first 
PFFS contract was approved by CMS in 2000 for Sterling Life Insurance, followed by 
PacifiCare in 2001 and Humana in 2003. Thirty-seven plan sponsors had entered the PFFS 
market by 2007. As of 2007, there were “482 unique plan designs and premium 
combinations in operation” and all beneficiaries now have access to at least one PFFS plan.   
BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 7-8. 
 187. Lindsay Harris, Lori Achman, & Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage and Medicare 
Beneficiaries: Monthly Tracking Report for September 2004, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., Oct. 8, 2004, at 1, available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/Medicare-
Advantage-Monthly-Tracking-Report-September-2004.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); 
Marsha Gold & Lindsay Harris, Tracking Medicare Health and Prescription Drug Plans: 
Monthly Report for July 2005, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Jul. 20, 2005, at 1, 
available at www.kff.org/medicare/upload/TrackingMedicareHealthandPrescriptionDrugPlans 
-July202005-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); Peterson & Gold, supra note 16. 
 188. See Peterson & Gold, supra note 16.   
 189. GRONNIGER & SUNSHINE, supra note 21. 
 190. 42 C.F.R §422.4(a)(3) (2007); see also PICARD, supra note 145, at 3. 
 191. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 13.  The benchmark rate for plan bidding is greater 
than the traditional Medicare rate and is derived from a formula set by the BBA and 
subsequent legislation that was meant to raise payment levels for private plans operating in 
rural areas and small urban markets. Consequently, for many counties, often referred to as 
floor counties, the benchmark payment rate is significantly higher than traditional Medicare 
county-level spending.  Many PFFS sponsors have targeted their offerings toward these floor 
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an insurer’s perspective, PFFS has a number of advantages compared with 
other MA plans.  Unlike R-PPOs that are restricted to operating at the 
regional level, PFFS plans are permitted to operate at the county level and, 
therefore, can target high payment areas.192  Because they are not required 
to have a provider network, PFFS plans enjoy much easier market entry and 
relatively low administrative costs.193 
Additionally, “firms that currently offer Medigap policies may see [PFFS] 
plans as an attractive alternative for their Medigap policyholders, because 
they can now offer a government-subsidized source of supplemental 
coverage” to reduce monthly premiums.194  Indeed, the PFFS option might 
become very popular with employers, both public and private, who offer 
health benefits to Medicare-eligible retirees because the plans without 
provider networks offer potential for better access for retirees who have 
relocated throughout the country.195 
Whereas the MMA requires other MA plans to offer Part D prescription 
drug benefits, the legislation explicitly exempts PFFS plans from this 
requirement.196  Furthermore, the MMA specifically exempts PFFS plans from 
provisions that permit CMS to negotiate with MA plans over whether their 
bid submissions “‘reasonably and equitably’ reflect the costs of health care 
services and supplies provided.”197  This exemption allows PFFS plans to 
retain more of their overpayments for administration and profit, rather than 
having to pass most of the overpayments on to beneficiaries in the form of 
lower cost sharing or extra benefits.  Recent evidence finds that PFFS plans 
retain about half of the 19% overpayments, even though PFFS incurs much 
lower administration costs than a typical MA coordinated-care plan.198 
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006199 made an additional 
modification to the MA program for 2007 and 2008 to promote enrollment 
 
counties, and most PFFS plan enrollees reside in these areas.  Id. at 12-13; see also MEDPAC, 
PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 64. 
 192. Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing, supra note 186, at 2; see also BLUM ET AL., 
supra note 146, at 13 (stating that PFFS sponsors have targeted their products toward the 
higher paying floor counties and finding that 90% of PFFS plan enrollees reside in these 
areas). 
 193. Neuman, Medicare Advantage Hearing, supra note 186, at 2. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  However, as discussed infra at notes 216–18 and accompanying text, there are 
increasing reports of providers who are refusing to see PFFS patients, thereby undermining the 
intent of relying on PFFS plans to offer access equivalent to what  traditional Medicare offers. 
 196. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 2. 
 197. Id. at 13. 
 198. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 63 tbl.3-1, 
64. 
 199. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a), 405(a)). 
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in certain PFFS plans.200  The new legislation allows “Medicare beneficiaries 
enrolled in traditional fee-for-service (Original) Medicare a one-time 
opportunity to enroll in an MA plan that does not offer the drug benefit at 
any time during the year rather than only during the open and annual 
enrollment periods from November 15 to March 31.”201 
PFFS plans are also exempt from statutory and regulatory patient-
protection standards that apply to other MA plans.  By virtue of the 
“deeming” provision discussed below, PFFS plans may be exempted from an 
assessment of whether they have an adequate number of providers in an 
area to ensure beneficiary access to care.202  PFFS plans do not have to 
establish a program to improve the quality of care provided to enrollees, 
but, if they offer Part D, they must establish a drug utilization management 
program or medication therapy management program to reduce the risk of 
adverse events.203 
The most fundamental advantage PFFS plans have over other MA plans, 
and the one that demonstrates congressional intent to effectively privatize 
Medicare,204 is the “deeming” provision.  Because providers in rural and 
small urban areas tend to have negotiating leverage over health plans,205 
the deeming provision apparently was created to give the plans a non-
market advantage by effectively giving them regulatory authority over 
providers to set payment rates.  By statute, a provider is deemed a 
contracting provider if, before furnishing services, the provider has been 
informed of the patient’s enrollment in the plan and “[h]as either been 
informed of the terms and conditions of payment for the services under the 
plan, or [i]s given reasonable opportunity to obtain that information.”206  
PFFS plans have the option of creating provider networks and may set 
payment at any level they agree on with providers participating in such a 
network.207  Absent a network, a plan must pay at least the same payment 
 
 200. BLUM ET AL., supra note 146, at 2. 
 201. This provision specifically helps PFFS plans because they do not have to offer Part D 
benefits.  Id at 2-3. 
 202. PICARD, supra note 145, at 15. 
 203. Id.; see also, BLUM ET AL., supra note 146 (providing comprehensive reviews of how 
the requirements for PFFS plans differ from other MA plans). 
 204. Berenson, supra note 18, at 14. 
 205. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL PREFERRED PROVIDER 
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT 3 (Oct. 2004), available at 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5997/10-27-PPOUnderMedicare.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 
2007). 
 206. PICARD, supra note 145, at 9-10 (noting that “[b]ecause the ‘reasonable opportunity’ 
bar is set very low, in practice, providers are generally considered ‘deemed’ if they have been 
informed of the patient’s enrollment under the plan before providing treatment”). 
 207. Id. 
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rate as under traditional Medicare, using the same payment methods.208  
Most PFFS plans have chosen to deem providers, rather than set up a 
network.209 
The deeming provision represents an extraordinary opportunity for one 
set of private parties, namely health plans, to impose payment rates on 
other private parties, namely providers, outside of usual marketplace 
negotiations.210  The deeming provision and the 19% overpayment combine 
to provide PFFS plans a unique arbitrage opportunity.  That is, PFFS plans 
receive 19% more than Medicare would pay but are legislatively 
empowered to turn around and pay providers at Medicare rates.211  They do 
not bear the same costs administering the program as coordinated care MA 
plans do because of all the special provisions enacted on their behalf.  
Therefore, PFFS plans can either apply most of the excess payments to offer 
extra benefits that entice beneficiaries to enroll or keep the extra payments 
as profit.212 
At first blush from a beneficiary’s point of view, the PFFS option seems 
very desirable because a beneficiary does not have to join a plan with a 
restricted provider network or one that performs utilization management to 
limit services, yet she receives extra benefits.  It appears to be a no-lose 
opportunity for beneficiaries, and, indeed, insurers have marketed the PFFS 
option as a plan that is equivalent to the traditional Medicare program but 
with more benefits.213  Thus, it is not surprising that enrollment skyrocketed 
once the MMA significantly increased the payments to PFFS plans. 
 
 208. Id. at 11-13. 
 209. MEDPAC, PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE, supra note 13, at 65. 
 210. See infra notes 214–15 and accompanying text for limitations on the deeming 
authority. 
 211. Although PFFS plans are required to pay at least Medicare rates, some physician 
organizations allege that they actually pay less than Medicare would pay and may impose 
administrative compliance requirements that are more onerous than Medicare's, leading to 
additional practice costs on deemed physicians.  See Sue U. Malone, Executive Report: 
Physicians Be Aware: Educate Yourselves Regarding Medicare Advantage and Part D Plans, 
ONLINE SAN MATEO COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, Feb. 2007, www.smcma.org/ 
Bulletin/BulletinIssues/Feb07issue/ExecutiveReport.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); AM. MED. 
ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 1001: DEEMED PARTICIPATION AND MISLEADING 
MARKETING BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRIVATE FEE FOR SERVICE PLANS, available at www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/475/1001.doc (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 197–98 (explaining that because PFFS bids are 
not subject to CMS bid negotiation, PFFS plans can garner increased profits). 
 213. See PICARD, supra note 145, at 11-13.  Furthermore, there is evidence that many 
PFFS-plan benefit structures impose greater out-of-pocket spending on sicker beneficiaries 
compared with other forms of MA plans and Medigap plans.  Marsha Gold, Medicare 
Advantage in 2006-2007: What Congress Intended?, 2007 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCL.) W445, 
W453. 
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However, there is one limitation on the deeming provision that may put 
some breaks on the rapid migration of beneficiaries to PFFS plans.  
Although deemed providers do not get to negotiate the terms and 
conditions that plans impose on them, they do have the option of not 
providing services to a PFFS-enrolled patient seeking care.214  Further, a 
provider that is deemed a contracting provider for an enrollee for one visit 
does not have to provide services to that enrollee during subsequent visits.  
Nor does the provider have to provide services to other enrollees in the 
same plan.  In other words, a provider may accept the terms of the PFFS 
plan on an enrollee-by-enrollee and service-by-service basis.215 
Recent reports from Medicare beneficiary advocacy groups216 and 
anecdotal newspaper articles217 suggest that providers are refusing to see 
PFFS enrollees, as is permitted under the deeming provision.  For providers, 
the choice is a difficult one of feeling “forced into an unacceptable choice 
of either abandoning established patients who sign up for PFFS plans or 
having to accept the terms of participation.”218  In short, the deeming 
provision at the core of the PFFS model significantly advantages PFFS plans 
over other plans and, along with substantial overpayments, the traditional 
Medicare program.  Yet, because PFFS plans cannot actually ensure 
beneficiaries access to deemed providers, it is still unstable in terms of 
access to care. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
  In 2007, the Medicare Advantage program is providing an affordable, 
high value choice for all Medicare beneficiaries.  Enrollment is at an all-time 
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high and plans are available in every region of the country, including rural 
areas.  Medicare Advantage (MA) plans are a particularly important option 
for lower-income and minority beneficiaries. 
  The value and availability of plans is a direct result of Congressional 
policies establishing minimum rates for MA plans in some regions where the 
MA option was not yet available.  These policies were established to ensure 
wide availability of MA plans and to do so, in part, by providing extra 
benefits to enrollees. 
  Beneficiaries should be able to have a choice of alternative delivery 
systems and MA plans have the flexibility to deliver innovative care 
management that is not encouraged in the FFS system.  Eliminating the 
policies that have led to the wide-spread availability of MA plans could limit 
beneficiary access to these alternative delivery systems, and the care 
management services they can provide.  While it is unclear how plans or 
beneficiaries would react, we know that before these policies were enacted, 
particularly those in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), far fewer 
beneficiaries had a choice of a private plan.219 
It is not unusual for political leadership, including senior officials at an 
agency like CMS, to advocate in relation to the programs they have 
responsibility for administering.  However, the quote cited here is from the 
introduction to an unsigned report on the state of Medicare Advantage in 
2007, which, at the time of this writing, was featured on the home page of 
the CMS Web site.  It is presented not as a viewpoint of political leadership 
but, rather, as an objective review of the state of the MA program as 
Congress considers partly leveling the playing field on which MA plans are 
thriving.  The document continues at some length to present one-sided, 
misleading, or distorted information and some propaganda to support the 
policy status quo.220 
The CMS Web site221 is not directed specifically toward beneficiaries 
facing the choice of either staying in traditional Medicare or joining a 
private plan alternative.  However, this fairly obvious attempt to influence 
congressional consideration of MA payment reductions suggests an unusual 
agency boosterism for private plans that contributes to an un-level playing 
field for competition between private plans and traditional Medicare.  This 
article reviewed other less than even-handed implementation of what 
Congress authorized, including spin in Handbooks sent to all beneficiaries, 
lax oversight of marketing abuses, and decisions to use the risk adjustment 
system for modifying plan payments to send extra money to plans even after 
 
 219. CMS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN 2007, supra note 8, at 3. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Medicare: The Official U.S. Government Site for People with Medicare, 
www.Medicare.gov (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). 
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Congress provided large increases to plans in their base payment rates 
under the MMA. 
In the late 1990s, conservative advocates of market-based Medicare 
restructuring asserted that CMS could not evenhandedly administer the 
Medicare+Choice program because it had a basic conflict between 
operating the traditional program and “establishing and managing the 
market for the increasing range of plans that are offered to seniors at a 
monthly premium.”222  No organizational changes occurred at that time 
despite these concerns about CMS’s will and ability to administer 
evenhandedly.  Now, CMS boosterism threatens to undermine the 
traditional Medicare program by making operational policy that favor 
private plans. 
Clearly, any attempt to formally define the element of level-playing-field 
competition among private plans and between private plans and traditional 
Medicare needs to again address the issue of where administrative 
responsibility should be lodged and what governance protections are 
needed to ensure that Congress’s intent is being even handedly 
implemented. 
This article has attempted to identify the major reasons why the playing 
field between private health plans and traditional Medicare is tilted and offer 
suggestions for correction.  However, more fundamentally, there needs to 
be an immediate debate about whether there should even be a level playing 
field and, if so, how to achieve and maintain it.  This debate would include 
issues that go beyond the scope of this article, such as the extent to which 
the traditional program should be permitted to manage care and costs as a 
competing plan, albeit with some restraints that might not apply to private 
plans.  Additionally, this discussion needs to consider whether an array of 
private plan types should be promoted regardless of whether they offer 
important alternative choices to the traditional program or whether, as is the 
case for R-PPOs and the PFFS plans, private plans that are essentially 
traditional Medicare look-alikes are being advantaged primarily to 
undermine the government-administered traditional Medicare program.  In 
the meantime, the quickest and most effective action Congress can take 
would be to reduce or eliminate the current overpayments that MA plans 
enjoy. 
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rival products, should have neither an interest in promoting any particular product nor even a 
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